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Animal rights

From Tilcayo Cats, the lean encyclopaedia by Tilcayo Knowledge Systems

Animal rights is the view in moral philosophy that at least some animals have rights of their own, so that certain ways of treating them are wrong whatever the benefit to humans. One of the most influential versions was set out by the philosopher Tom Regan. It is one of several positions about how people should treat animals; the wider field is covered in Animal ethics.

The rights view

Regan's book The Case for Animal Rights (1983) is one of the most influential works on animals and ethics.[1] Regan argued that any being that is a "subject-of-a-life" has inherent value.[2] On his account, many animals are, like humans, experiencing subjects of a life with inherent value of their own.[3]

For Regan, respecting a being with inherent value means not using it merely as a means to someone else's ends.[4] He therefore held that raising animals for food and experimenting on them treat animals merely as a means.[5][6] According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the rights position holds that such uses of animals are wrong "irrespective of human need, context, or culture".[7]

In this theory, rights act as "trumps" against attempts to produce the greatest overall good.[8] Regan accepted that rights can conflict; in such cases he argued that people should try to keep the number of rights overridden as small as possible.[9] He held that overriding someone's rights simply to make everyone better off is never allowed.[10]

Rights and utilitarian views

The view of the philosopher Peter Singer is often called an animal rights position, but the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes his utilitarian approach as quite distinct from it.[11] The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy groups thinking about the moral standing of animals into three kinds: indirect theories, direct but unequal theories, and moral equality theories.[12]

Earlier views

On indirect theories, animals matter morally only because of how they are related to human beings.[13] Philosophers linked with such views include Immanuel Kant, René Descartes, Thomas Aquinas and Peter Carruthers.[14] Kant held that people should be kind to animals because "he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men".[15] Descartes argued that animals are automata that may act as if conscious but are not.[16]

Arguments and criticism

One argument used by supporters is the "argument from marginal cases". It holds that if denying direct moral status to animals is justified, then denying it to some humans, such as infants, would be justified too.[17] The philosopher Joel Feinberg argued that a being can have a right if it can be represented as pursuing its own interests.[18]

Critics have challenged the view in several ways. Some philosophers have argued that only human beings have rights, or that only humans are rational, able to act morally, or part of the moral community.[19] R. G. Frey questioned the idea of rights itself, echoing Jeremy Bentham's description of rights as "nonsense on stilts".[20]

Later developments

Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka's book Zoopolis (2011) is an animal rights theory built around the different relationships people have with animals.[21] In their view, all sentient animals share basic rights against being killed or confined, while other rights depend on those relationships.[22] They argue that domesticated animals are owed the status of citizens.[23]

In law, animals are not legal persons and are treated as property.[24] There have been a few attempts to change the legal status of some animals from property to persons.[25] For example, the Nonhuman Rights Project has brought cases in the New York courts seeking legal personhood for particular chimpanzees.[26]

See also

References

  1. ↑ Scott D. Wilson. "Animals and Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. Tom Regan's seminal work, The Case for Animal Rights , is one of the most influential works on the topic of animals and ethics.
  2. ↑ Scott D. Wilson. "Animals and Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. According to Regan, any being that is a subject-of-a-life is a being that has inherent value.
  3. ↑ Lori Gruen (12 August 2024). "The Moral Status of Animals". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. they too must be viewed as the experiencing subjects of a life, with inherent value of their own.
  4. ↑ Scott D. Wilson. "Animals and Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. A being that has inherent value is a being towards which we must show respect; in order to show respect to such a being, we cannot use it merely as a means to our ends.
  5. ↑ Scott D. Wilson. "Animals and Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. When we raise animals for food, regardless of how they are treated and how they are killed, we are using them as a means to our ends
  6. ↑ Scott D. Wilson. "Animals and Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. Likewise, when we experiment on animals in order to advance human science, we are using animals merely as a means to our ends.
  7. ↑ Lori Gruen (12 August 2024). "The Moral Status of Animals". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. eating animals, hunting animals, experimenting on animals, using animals for entertainment, is wrong, irrespective of human need, context, or culture.
  8. ↑ Scott D. Wilson. "Animals and Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. The significance of having a right, however, is that rights act as "trumps" against the pursuit of utility.
  9. ↑ Scott D. Wilson. "Animals and Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. Regan argues that in these sorts of cases we must try to minimize the rights that are overriden.
  10. ↑ Scott D. Wilson. "Animals and Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. However, we are not permitted to override someone's rights just because doing so will make everyone better off; in this kind of case we are sacrificing rights for utility, which is never permissible on Regan's view.
  11. ↑ Lori Gruen (12 August 2024). "The Moral Status of Animals". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. The utilitarian position on animals, most commonly associated with Peter Singer and popularly, though erroneously, referred to as an animal rights position, is actually quite distinct.
  12. ↑ Scott D. Wilson. "Animals and Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. Philosophical thinking on the moral standing of animals is diverse and can be generally grouped into three general categories: Indirect theories, direct but unequal theories, and moral equality theories.
  13. ↑ Scott D. Wilson. "Animals and Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. On indirect theories, animals do not warrant our moral concern on their own, but may warrant concern only in so far as they are appropriately related to human beings.
  14. ↑ Scott D. Wilson. "Animals and Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. Arguments in this category have been formulated by philosophers such as Immanuel Kant , René Descartes , Thomas Aquinas , Peter Carruthers, and various religious theories.
  15. ↑ Lori Gruen (12 August 2024). "The Moral Status of Animals". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. he must practice kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men.
  16. ↑ Scott D. Wilson. "Animals and Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. who argues that animals are automata that might act as if they are conscious, but really are not so
  17. ↑ Scott D. Wilson. "Animals and Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. If we are justified in denying direct moral status to animals then we are justified in denying direct moral status to the marginal cases.
  18. ↑ Scott D. Wilson. "Animals and Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. Joel Feinberg has argued that all is required in order for a being to have a right is that the being be capable of being represented as legitimately pursuing the furtherance of its interests (Feinberg, 1974).
  19. ↑ Scott D. Wilson. "Animals and Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. Some philosophers have used the following claims on this strategy: (1) only human beings have rights; (2) only human beings are rational, autonomous, and self-conscious; (3) only human beings are able to act morally; and (4) only human beings are part of the moral community.
  20. ↑ Scott D. Wilson. "Animals and Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. Frey have questioned the legitimacy of the very idea of rights, echoing Bentham's famous claim that rights are "nonsense on stilts" (Frey, 1980).
  21. ↑ Lori Gruen (12 August 2024). "The Moral Status of Animals". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. The animal rights theory that most characteristically incorporates the obligations that arise as a result of various relations is Donaldson and Kymlicka's Zoopolis (2011).
  22. ↑ Lori Gruen (12 August 2024). "The Moral Status of Animals". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. While all sentient animals hold the same basic negative rights, meaning they are protected against killing, torture, slavery, and confinement, other rights arise as a result of the different relations that humans have had with specific animals.
  23. ↑ Lori Gruen (12 August 2024). "The Moral Status of Animals". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. Domesticated animals, whom we have historically forced into a relationship of dependence with us, are owed the status of citizens.
  24. ↑ Lori Gruen (12 August 2024). "The Moral Status of Animals". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. But all animals, infants and adults, are not legal persons, but rather, under the law they are considered property.
  25. ↑ Lori Gruen (12 August 2024). "The Moral Status of Animals". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. There have been a few attempts to change the legal status of some nonhuman animals from property to persons.
  26. ↑ Lori Gruen (12 August 2024). "The Moral Status of Animals". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 October 2026. has filed a series of cases in the New York courts seeking to establish legal personhood for particular chimpanzees being held in the state
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