Epistemic responsibility

Tilcayo Cats original · British Bees · Sources and editorial assessment · Originals retention rule

Epistemic responsibility is the idea that people can believe well or badly, and that we have responsibilities about how we form our beliefs. In the philosophy of religion this is often called the ethics of belief, and it centres on one question: when is it reasonable to believe in God?

Evidentialism

Evidentialism, historically associated with John Locke, holds that religious belief is rational only when it is supported by evidence. That evidence must be independent of the believer's religious commitments, and it should be evidence that any rational person would accept. The classic proofs of God's existence are attempts to meet this standard, but they remain controversial (see Existence of God).

Evidentialism also offers one route to atheism: if the public evidence does not support God, the evidentialist conclusion is not to believe.

Fideism

Fideism, associated with Søren Kierkegaard and Ludwig Wittgenstein, rejects the demand for evidence in religion. On this view religious belief is arational: it is a matter of faith, not something to be weighed by evidence.

A milder version, sometimes called quasi-fideism, points out that the most basic convictions in every area of life rest on commitments that are not themselves based on evidence. If that is true, religious beliefs that build on such commitments can still be rational.

Reformed epistemology

Reformed epistemology, associated with Alvin Plantinga, asks that religious belief be held to the same standards as ordinary beliefs based on perception. We believe what we see without independent proof, and Plantinga suggests that a sensus divinitatis, a natural sense of the divine, may ground rational belief in God in a similar way.

An objection is that not everyone seems to have this sense. Defenders reply that the question is whether belief is rational for the believer, not whether it can persuade non-believers.

The exemplar approach

Pritchard also describes an approach that models religious belief on ethical belief. In ethics, expertise and the example of admirable people matter, and the same may be true of religious belief.

William James and the will to believe

The philosopher William James argued in The Will to Believe that faith can be reasonable without sufficient evidence. He held that the religious choice is a genuine option, one that is living, forced and momentous. Because the choice is forced, James argued, holding back as an agnostic is in effect choosing against belief. So the only real options are faith or atheism. He held that will and feeling rightly shape belief, and he drew on a gamble similar to Pascal's wager.

James is grouped with Peirce, Schiller and Dewey as a pragmatist. Pragmatism judges beliefs by their practical consequences.

Disagreement

Another question is what to do when thoughtful people disagree about religion. J. Adam Carter separates the ethics of disagreement from its epistemology and asks what it is rational to believe when religious "peers" reach different conclusions. This belongs to social epistemology.

Belief and hope

Some philosophers suggest that hope, not just belief, deserves attention. Mark Johnston argues that we are practically required to hold certain beliefs about our own nature, and may rationally hope for other embodiments after death. Dean Zimmerman examines which attitudes towards an afterlife are justified.

See also

• Faith
• Existence of God
• Agnosticism
• Atheism