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Biocentrism (ethics)

From Tilcayo Cats, the lean encyclopaedia by Tilcayo Knowledge Systems

Biocentrism is a view in environmental ethics that gives moral value to every living thing, not only to humans or to animals that can feel. Supporters argue that organisms have value in achieving their own good, whether or not they are capable of consciousness.[1] It is one of several approaches in which philosophers have argued that individual living organisms have moral standing.[2] It differs from anthropocentrism: many traditional Western ethical views are "anthropocentric or human-centered", giving intrinsic value to human beings alone or far more value to humans than to anything else.[3]

Reverence for Life

One of the earliest thinkers to put forward such an argument was Albert Schweitzer. His "Reverence for Life" ethic, set out in 1923, holds that all living things have a "will to live" and that humans should not interfere with or end it.[4] The philosopher Alasdair Cochrane notes a common criticism: willing to live would seem to need conscious experience, which many living things lack.[5]

Paul Taylor's biocentrism

The philosopher Paul Taylor developed the best-known version of the view in 1981 and 1986; the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes it as somewhat deontological, meaning it is based on duties rather than outcomes.[6] Taylor argued that every individual living thing, whether an animal, a plant or a micro-organism, is a "teleological centre of life" with a good of its own that can be helped or harmed.[7] For Taylor, that good is the full development of the organism's biological powers.[8] He held that all such beings have equal "inherent worth", which entitles them to moral respect,[9] and that this gives people a duty, other things being equal, to protect or promote the good of wild living things for their own sake.[10]

Other versions

Not all biocentrists treat every living thing as equal. Robin Attfield has argued for a hierarchical view in which all beings with a good of their own have intrinsic value, but some, such as persons, have more of it.[11] Attfield also takes a consequentialist approach, trying to balance the many and possibly conflicting goods of different living things.[12]

Criticism

Some critics argue that talk of an organism's biological "good" only describes what helps it survive and does not show what we ought to do.[13] Another objection is practical: humans must destroy many living organisms simply to live, to eat, find shelter and make clothes.[14] Schweitzer's own answer was that people may harm or end a life only when it is absolutely necessary.[15]

See also

References

  1. ↑ Brennan, Andrew; Lo, Norva Y. S. (3 December 2021). "Environmental Ethics". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026. arguing for the intrinsic value of organisms achieving their own good, whether those organisms are capable of consciousness or not
  2. ↑ Cochrane, Alasdair. "Environmental Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026. a number of philosophers have come up with arguments to justify assigning moral standing to individual living organisms
  3. ↑ Brennan, Andrew; Lo, Norva Y. S. (3 December 2021). "Environmental Ethics". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026. Many traditional western ethical perspectives, however, are anthropocentric or human-centered in that either they assign intrinsic value to human beings alone
  4. ↑ Cochrane, Alasdair. "Environmental Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026. Schweitzer's influential "Reverence for Life" ethic claims that all living things have a "will to live", and that humans should not interfere with or extinguish this will (Schweitzer, 1923)
  5. ↑ Cochrane, Alasdair. "Environmental Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026. it is simply not true that they "will" to live. This, after all, would require some kind of conscious experience, which many living things lack
  6. ↑ Brennan, Andrew; Lo, Norva Y. S. (3 December 2021). "Environmental Ethics". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026. Paul Taylor's version of this view (1981 and 1986), which we might call biocentrism , is a somewhat deontological example
  7. ↑ Brennan, Andrew; Lo, Norva Y. S. (3 December 2021). "Environmental Ethics". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026. each individual living thing in nature—whether it is an animal, a plant, or a micro-organism—is a "teleological-center-of-life" having a good or well-being of its own which can be enhanced or damaged
  8. ↑ Cochrane, Alasdair. "Environmental Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026. This good, according to Taylor, is the full development of an organism's biological powers
  9. ↑ Brennan, Andrew; Lo, Norva Y. S. (3 December 2021). "Environmental Ethics". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026. all individuals who are teleological-centers-of life have equal intrinsic value (or what he calls "inherent worth") which entitles them to moral respect
  10. ↑ Brennan, Andrew; Lo, Norva Y. S. (3 December 2021). "Environmental Ethics". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026. the intrinsic value of wild living things generates a prima facie moral duty on our part to preserve or promote their goods as ends in themselves
  11. ↑ Brennan, Andrew; Lo, Norva Y. S. (3 December 2021). "Environmental Ethics". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026. Robin Attfield (1987) argues for a hierarchical view that while all beings having a good of their own have intrinsic value, some of them (e.g., persons) have intrinsic value to a greater extent
  12. ↑ Brennan, Andrew; Lo, Norva Y. S. (3 December 2021). "Environmental Ethics". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026. Attfield also endorses a form of consequentialism which takes into consideration, and attempts to balance, the many and possibly conflicting goods of different living things
  13. ↑ Brennan, Andrew; Lo, Norva Y. S. (3 December 2021). "Environmental Ethics". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026. some critics have pointed out that the notion of biological good or well-being is only descriptive not prescriptive (see Williams 1992 and O'Neill 1993, Ch. 2)
  14. ↑ Cochrane, Alasdair. "Environmental Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026. don't we as humans require the destruction of many living organisms simply in order to live?
  15. ↑ Cochrane, Alasdair. "Environmental Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026. Schweitzer's answer is that we can only harm or end the life of a living entity when absolutely necessary
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