Sentientism
Sentientism is the view in ethics that what matters for whether a being deserves moral consideration is whether it is sentient, that is, whether it can have experiences such as pleasure and suffering. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy calls the philosopher Jeremy Bentham one of the most forceful defenders of this "sentientist view of moral considerability", and quotes his famous question about animals: "Can they suffer?"[1]
The argument
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy sets out the basic argument as follows: if a being is sentient, it has direct moral status; most animals are sentient; so most animals have direct moral status.[2] Utilitarian philosophers such as Peter Singer argue that there is no morally justifiable way to leave out of moral consideration non-humans who can clearly suffer, and that any being with an interest in not suffering deserves to have that interest taken into account.[3]
Which beings count
Because the view depends on which beings are sentient, it is tied to scientific evidence. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, writers have now made sentience-based cases for the moral status of fishes, octopuses, arthropods and decapod crustaceans.[4] The same source notes that sentience cannot be directly observed, so there is much uncertainty about animals very distant from us in evolution, such as insects, and several authors have argued for precautionary principles as a result.[5]
Criticism
Environmental philosophers have criticised sentience-based views for leaving out much of nature. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains, on a utilitarian view non-sentient things such as plant species, rivers, mountains and landscapes, which environmentalists care about, have no intrinsic value and at most instrumental value.[6] Other philosophers suggest grounding moral status in agency instead; for example, Lessard (2024) argues that, for the legal protection of animals, agency offers a better basis than sentience.[7]
References
- ↑ "The Moral Status of Animals". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
Bentham, one of the more forceful defenders of this sentientist view of moral considerability, famously wrote: ... Can they suffer? (Bentham 1780/1789: chapter xvii, paragraph 6)
- ↑ "Animals and Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
If a being is sentient then it has direct moral status. (Most) animals are sentient Therefore (most) animals have direct moral status.
- ↑ "The Moral Status of Animals". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
Contemporary utilitarians, such as Peter Singer (1990, [1979] 1993), suggest that there is no morally justifiable way to exclude from moral consideration non-humans or non-persons who can clearly suffer. Any being that has an interest in not suffering deserves to have that interest taken into account.
- ↑ "The Moral Status of Animals". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
There are now sentience-based defenses of the moral status of fishes (Bovenkerk & Meijboom 2011; Balcombe 2017), octopuses (Mather 2020; King & Marino 2019; Jacquet et al. 2019), arthropods (Mikhalevich & Powell 2020), and decapod crustaceans (Crump et al. 2022).
- ↑ "The Moral Status of Animals". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
sentience remains a non-observable capacity, and consequently despite the scientific advances there is a lot of uncertainty regarding the sentience of animals that are very phylogenetically distant from us, such as insects. As a result, several authors have defended the need to incorporate precautionary principles to guide our interactions with these animals
- ↑ "Environmental Ethics". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
for the utilitarian, non-sentient objects in the environment such as plant species, rivers, mountains, and landscapes, all of which are the objects of moral concern for environmentalists, are of no intrinsic but at most instrumental value
- ↑ "The Moral Status of Animals". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
Lessard (2024) argues that grounding moral status in agency can offer a better alternative than sentience for the legal protection of animals