Sentience
Sentience is often defined as the ability to have experiences that feel good or bad, such as pain or pleasure.[1] The idea is important in the study of animal minds and in debates about how people should treat animals.[2]
Meaning
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes sentience as the capacity to experience "positively or negatively valenced awareness", meaning awareness that feels pleasant or unpleasant.[3] In discussions of animal consciousness, the word puts special emphasis on experiences such as pleasure and pain.[4]
Study of animal sentience
Researchers from neuroscience, comparative psychology, animal welfare and veterinary science, evolutionary biology and philosophy now work together in a field sometimes called "animal sentience research".[5] A journal called Animal Sentience was founded in 2016.[6] Because sentience cannot be observed directly, there is still much uncertainty about whether animals very distant from humans, such as insects, are sentient.[7] Some philosophers use an argument from analogy: the more like humans a being is, the stronger the case for thinking it is sentient.[8]
Sentience in ethics
The philosopher Jeremy Bentham argued that what matters is whether animals can suffer, writing that "the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?"[9] Utilitarian philosophers such as Peter Singer have argued that there is no good reason to leave out of moral consideration beings who can clearly suffer.[10] According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, even some philosophers in the Kantian tradition have accepted the moral force of pain.[11] Others give animals some moral consideration but not equal status, on the grounds that animals cannot respect another's rights or return moral obligations.[12]
Writers have also made sentience-based cases for the moral status of fish, octopuses, arthropods and decapod crustaceans.[13]
Sentience in law
Respect for animals is written into law in several places, including France, Spain, Sweden, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, and the European Union's Lisbon Treaty recognises animals as sentient beings.[14] In the United Kingdom, the Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022 set up an Animal Sentience Committee to look at how government policy affects the welfare of animals as sentient beings.[15]
See also
References
- ↑ "Animal Consciousness". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 13 January 2026. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
Sentience , often (though not always) defined as the ability to have affective (i.e. valenced) experiences such as pain or pleasure.
- ↑ "Animal Consciousness". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 13 January 2026. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
Yet questions of animal consciousness have tremendous significance for animal ethics and animal welfare
- ↑ "Animals and Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
"Sentience" refers to the capacity to experience episodes of positively or negatively valenced awareness.
- ↑ "Animal Consciousness". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 13 January 2026. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
In these contexts, the term "sentience" is usually used, and connotes a special emphasis on experiences with a positive or negative quality, such as pleasure and pain
- ↑ "Animal Consciousness". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 13 January 2026. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
There is now an emerging interdisciplinary field of "animal consciousness research" or "animal sentience research" bringing together researchers from neuroscience, comparative psychology, animal welfare and veterinary science, evolutionary biology, and philosophy.
- ↑ "Animal Consciousness". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 13 January 2026. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
many occurring in the pages of the journal Animal Sentience , founded in 2016.
- ↑ "The Moral Status of Animals". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
sentience remains a non-observable capacity, and consequently despite the scientific advances there is a lot of uncertainty regarding the sentience of animals that are very phylogenetically distant from us, such as insects.
- ↑ "Animals and Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
The general idea is that the justification for attributing sentience to a being grows stronger the more analogous it is to human beings.
- ↑ "The Moral Status of Animals". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? (Bentham 1780/1789: chapter xvii, paragraph 6)
- ↑ "The Moral Status of Animals". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
Contemporary utilitarians, such as Peter Singer (1990, [1979] 1993), suggest that there is no morally justifiable way to exclude from moral consideration non-humans or non-persons who can clearly suffer.
- ↑ "The Moral Status of Animals". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
Even contemporary Kantians have acknowledged the moral force of the experience of pain.
- ↑ "Animals and Ethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
Direct but unequal theories accord some moral consideration to animals, but deny them a fuller moral status due to their inability to respect another agent's rights or display moral reciprocity
- ↑ "The Moral Status of Animals". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
There are now sentience-based defenses of the moral status of fishes
- ↑ "Animal Consciousness". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 13 January 2026. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
Respect for animals is now written into law in France, Peru, Quebec, Spain, Sweden, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, and recognition of animals as sentient beings also features in the European Union's Lisbon Treaty
- ↑ "Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022". legislation.gov.uk. Retrieved 20 October 2026.
An Act to make provision for an Animal Sentience Committee with functions relating to the effect of government policy on the welfare of animals as sentient beings.